How can this be resolved?

Mechanism

The Brussels political parties eventually reach a coalition agreement on a comprehensive government programme. A formateur appointed by Parliament negotiates the ministerial portfolios and policy content.

Precedent

Federal Belgium: after 541 days without a government, formation of the Di Rupo government (2010-2011). Then 494 days before the De Croo government (2019-2020). (Belgium, 2011)

Risks

• Prolonged negotiations with no guarantee of a result
• A watered-down compromise that fails to address the accumulated emergencies
• Voter fatigue in the face of a scenario already seen at the federal level

Mechanism

Parliament tables a constructive motion of no confidence against the caretaker government, accompanied by a candidate for minister-president and a programme

Risks

• A majority is required simultaneously in BOTH linguistic groups — extremely difficult to assemble
• Never used at the level of the Brussels-Capital Region
• The caretaker government is not technically 'in office' in the full sense, creating a legal ambiguity
• Risk of institutional crisis if the motion's admissibility is challenged

Mechanism

The parties agree on a short government programme limited to emergencies: passing the budget, absorbing European funds, and unblocking critical pending matters. No comprehensive coalition agreement.

Risks

• No formal precedent in Belgium — possible political resistance
• Risk that the 'temporary' becomes permanent without resolving underlying disagreements
• Questionable legitimacy if the mandate is too limited for effective action
• Opposition parties may refuse to participate

Mechanism

A government formed without an absolute majority, operating on a case-by-case basis with shifting majorities depending on the issue

Precedent

Denmark, Sweden, Norway (common in Scandinavia), Canada. Never done in Belgium. (Denmark, 2022)

Risks

• Permanent instability — the government can be toppled at any time
• Total dependence on the goodwill of the opposition for each vote
• Every issue becomes a separate negotiation, considerably slowing public action
• Increased complexity in Brussels due to the dual linguistic majority

Mechanism

The federal Chamber of Representatives votes by a two-thirds majority to dissolve the Brussels Parliament and organise new regional elections. The King then sets the date of the ballot.

Risks

• The Brussels Parliament cannot dissolve itself — it has a fixed 5-year term
• Requires a two-thirds majority in the federal Chamber — a nearly impossible threshold to reach
• New elections would probably produce similar results without resolving the deadlock
• No precedent in Belgian history for the dissolution of a regional parliament
• Federal interference in regional affairs — perceived as an infringement on autonomy

Mechanism

A government composed of non-partisan experts, appointed to manage the Region's affairs outside the logic of classical coalition politics

Precedent

Italy (Monti 2011, Draghi 2021), never in Belgium (Italy, 2021)

Risks

• No direct democratic legitimacy — ministers do not carry a partisan electoral mandate
• Foreseeable resistance from political parties, who would lose control of the executive
• No Belgian precedent at any level of government
• Brussels ministers must be parliamentarians — an external expert cannot be appointed directly
• Limited lifespan without a lasting political anchor